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BEGELEIDENDE NOTA

van: het secretariaat

aan: de Conventie

Betreft: Bijdrage van de heer John Cushnahan, plaatsvervangend lid van de Conventie:
voorstel voor een kustwacht van de EU

De secretaris-generaal van de Conventie heeft van de heer John Cushnahan, plaatsvervangend lid van de Conventie, de bijdrage ontvangen die in bijlage dezes staat.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT



PROPOSAL FOR AN EU COASTGUARD

Contribution to the Convention on Europe

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Executive Summary

The rise of the Populist right across Europe, based on a anti-immigrant, anti-crime and even racist platform, raises some serious concerns. There is a growing perception that the present system is ineffective and inadequate and it is time that the EU acted decisively to address these concerns. The European Commission has recently announced proposal to create a European Border guard, but this alone does not go far enough because it does not address the vulnerability of EU coastal waters and coastline which are constantly exploited by organised crime for trafficking drugs, human beings, contraband cigarettes and terrorist arms. A co-ordinated EU response is necessary and urgent.

Why do we need an EU Coastguard?

Human trafficking in the EU has become an activity worth over €4 billion annually, with over 400,000 individuals entering the EU illegally every year, with approximately a quarter of these individuals being forced into prostitution. Drug trafficking remains a massive problem in the EU, over 800 tonnes of cannabis and 15 million Ecstasy tablets were seized in 1999 and these seizures only represent a small fraction of the drugs trade in Europe. Illegal trade in small arms, whose main recipients are terrorists and criminals is estimated to account for 10% of the global trade in arms. Cigarette smuggling has almost replaced drug trafficking as the main activity of organised crime gangs, due to the enormous profit margins that can be exploited, the loss in revenue to the EU is estimated at €1 billion per annum and in 2000 alone, some 6 billion contraband cigarettes were seized. The enduring environmental damage caused by the Erika disaster in 1999 for example when some 19,000 tonnes of oil were spilled further highlights the need for a co-ordinated EU response. The Zebra disaster and the recent joint rescue operation for the Scandinavia Princess between Britain and Sweden further emphasises the need for an EU Air/Sea Rescue force. The current reform of the Common Fisheries Policy which will almost certainly result in a reduction in tonnage will have to be policed carefully to ensure that the policy is implemented, an EU Coastguard would serve as a complement to the Joint Inspection Scheme that has already been proposed.

The EU could look towards the US Coastguard whose enforcement of U.S. treaties and laws focuses on conducting drug seizures, intercepting illegal immigrants and arms, inspecting American and foreign fishing vessels, performing air/sea rescues, helping to ensure safe vessel movement and enforcing marine environmental protection.

Conclusion

An EU Coastguard is necessary because it will be the most effective means of addressing the legitimate fears of European citizens concerning the operation of organised crime and illegal immigration on the seas of Europe, potential maritime pollution disasters and maritime safety. As a “communautaire” proposal, an EU Coastguard represents a step forward for the political development of Europe. Finally, one of the main concerns of the Convention on the Future of Europe is how to reconnect the EU to European citizens, an EU Coastguard would be a tangible, practical and visible representation of the EU in the lives of citizens.

“The expectations of Europe's citizens

...There have been frequent public calls for a greater EU role in justice and security, action against cross-border crime, control of migration flows and reception of asylum seekers and refugees from far-flung war zones

...They want a common approach on environmental pollution, climate change and food safety, in short, all transnational issues which they instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together.”

The Laeken Declaration (15/12/2001)

Introduction

The results of recent national elections in a number of EU member states revealed a deeply worrying political development. There has been a significant increase in support for new populist parties promoting an anti-immigrant and anti-crime message. This phenomenon has appeared even in traditionally liberal societies like Denmark and the Netherlands and also Austria, where, two years ago, the far-right Freedom Party of Jörg Haider entered government. The success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first round of the French presidential election also sent shockwaves throughout Europe. The recent successes of these racist and xenophobic politicians have been due to the fact that they have been able to exploit genuine concerns about the growth in illegal immigration and the significant increase in crime. This message has not been lost on EU leaders who recognise that they must move swiftly to address the problem.

The European Commission has responded by proposing a common EU border police force in order to tighten controls on the external borders of the European Union ahead of our planned expansion to the east and the south, when we will oversee the introduction of initially less secure borders within the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. The feasibility of the establishment of such a force was discussed at a recent meeting of Justice and Home Affairs ministers. While there is much merit in this idea, one of its major weaknesses is that it focuses primarily on land border

controls. It completely ignores our inability to satisfactorily police EU coastal waters and the EU coastline, the vulnerability of which is being successfully penetrated by international criminals plying their evil trade in human trafficking, drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling etc. Of the fifteen member states, twelve have sea borders. The EU coastline accounts for 89,000 km along several different regional seas (the Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the North Atlantic Ocean, and the European Arctic) and supports a population of approximately 69 million in the coastal municipalities: about 20% of the total EU population. The forthcoming enlargement of the EU, which will include the ten accession countries will add an additional 10,648 km to the EU coastline. Furthermore, when Bulgaria and Romania join the EU as forecast for 2007 and when Turkey meets the entrance criteria and is admitted into the EU, this will add a further 7,779 km of coastline. This would also imply that the Black Sea would become part of the EU coastline and expand sea access to the EU to much of Central Asia.

The EU coastal waters have become a hive of activity with shipping and fishing vessels in recent decades. Not only has there been an increase in international criminal activity, but there have been environmental disasters, shipping accidents, breaches of the Common Fisheries Policy and an increase in maritime leisure activity. Consequently, it is an opportune time to address the issue of maritime safety and security. Following are details of some of the problems that we are experiencing in these fields; problems that necessitate a co-ordinated EU response.

Human Trafficking

The German Intelligence Service, BND, has found that income earned through the smuggling of people into the European Union now exceeds \$4 billion annually, with 400,000 people entering the EU illegally every year. It has been estimated that of this total 120,000 are female who have been forced into a life of prostitution. The majority come from central and Eastern Europe, and are either lured with false promises of well-paid jobs in Western Europe or kidnapped by criminal gangs. The main reason for the upsurge has been the opening up of Eastern Europe combined with the dismantling of internal EU borders under the Schengen Agreement.

Others include illegal immigrants who are simply trying to escape dire economic and other circumstances in their country of origin in pursuit of a more prosperous future in certain EU member states. Their hopes are preyed upon by international criminal gangs who extort their life savings from them to facilitate their travel, with cases often ending in tragedy. In the port of

Rosslare in Co. Wexford, Ireland on the 9 December 2001, the bodies of eight Romanian refugees were found in a cargo container, while in the English port of Dover, 58 Chinese illegal immigrants died "in a hermetically-sealed refrigerated lorry".

Some of the routes used by these gangs are via boats from Albania, Tunisia or Morocco into southern Europe; from Sarajevo airport via Croatia and Slovenia into Italy and Austria; or overland starting from Istanbul and often ending up in Germany. Recently, a new route from Russia into Finland has emerged. Every month, hundreds of illegal immigrants try to enter Europe through Italy and over 77,000 people have been caught trying to enter illegally by sea in the past decade.

A recent report entitled "Trafficking in Persons", published by the US State Department (6 June 2002), has blacklisted 19 countries for not doing enough to stamp out human trafficking. It stated that some of the accession countries, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia, still have a considerable amount of work to do in this area. The strongest criticism was reserved for Turkey which, it is said, does not fully comply and nor has it made any significant efforts to do so. The report added that "it has no law against trafficking although draft anti-trafficking legislation is on the parliamentary agenda". With regard to current EU member states the report pointed out that Greece is the only EU member state that "does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so". It noted that the other member states complied fully with these criteria.

Drug Trafficking

The level of organised crime in the EU is increasing. Production and trafficking of drugs and the smuggling of cigarettes appear to remain the prime activities of criminal networks. The continuing diversification and evolution of drug routes challenge law-enforcement efforts. Criminals continue to examine the successes and failures in the trafficking of their illegal commodities and change their operations accordingly, whether by altering routes, devising new methods of concealment or recruiting new smugglers. The quantity seized of Amphetamines, Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin in the EU 15 in 1999 was 874,631 kilograms. This figure excluded a further 15,171,496 doses of LSD and Ecstasy seized also in 1999. (See Annex 1).

Drug seizures in Europe have dramatically increased in the last fifteen years. Turkish police made the world's largest seizure of heroin-grade morphine, an estimated 6,750 kilograms (14,850 pounds) of morphine, worth about \$29m (1 April, 2002). Police and Customs officers seized 250 kilograms of class A and B drugs in a lorry heading into Britain from Belgium (30 May, 2002). French customs officers seized more than 23 tonnes of cannabis resin hidden among a cargo of fish on board a Baltic trawler in the English Channel. The cannabis was reported to have a street value of more than \$230m (17 February, 1999). These seizures indicate the size and scale of the drug smuggling problem in Europe.

Trafficking in Arms and Weapons

Following the events of 11 September 2001, there have been increased fears of further terrorist attacks and concern has increased about the illegal global trade in arms and weapons. A recent report carried out by the Small Arms Survey concluded that illegal transactions account for over 10% of the global trade in small arms, worth over €1billion annually. In October 2001 a suspected Al-Quaeda terrorist was found inside a container in the Italian port of Gioia, fully equipped for the intended transatlantic journey and the recently averted 'dirty bomb' incident have further served to underline the fact that security is still a primary issue. At present, only 2% of sea transport containers are routinely screened and this might only occur after several journeys have been undertaken, exposing the weakness of the system. Recent incidents forced a change in policy in the United States. The US Coast Guard has boarded ships with armed sea marshalls, has been allocated further funding and has made it compulsory for ships to give earlier notice of arrival in port. All these measures serve to underline the same argument; that a security threat exists and therefore EU waters and maritime transport should be treated as seriously as aviation security, which is not the situation at present.

Cigarette Smuggling

In the last ten years, the smuggling of cigarettes has become one of the most extensive types of fraud in the European Union and in the world. Due to the enormous profits that can be gained through this type of fraud (typically EUR1 million on a single 40 foot container of cigarettes), organised crime has become extensively involved in the 'trade'. Exploitation of maritime security shortcomings lies at the heart of the smuggler's strategy. As with any other contraband, smuggled

cigarettes are brought into the Community both by passing through customs and imported into the country without passing through customs controls. In the former case, the cigarettes are imported into the Community by road, rail, air or sea passing through customs. If we look at the example of cigarettes smuggled into Italy (both for the Italian market and for onward transmission to other Community Member States) they are brought in by sea, and are normally transported by:

- * high-speed motorboats from the Adriatic coastlines of Albania and the former Yugoslavia;
- * motorboats or fishing boats which tranship their illegal loads from "parent ships" stationed outside territorial waters to the Italian coast;
- * in containers or in truck loads carried on ro-ro ferries into major ports where the consignment of smuggled tobacco is hidden by a 'cover load'.

In recent years international tobacco smuggling, particularly within the context of Community fraud, has increased very significantly throughout the Community. The impact it has had on European Union revenue has been estimated (1996) at around EUR1 billion a year (Source: UCLAF: Fight against Fraud 1996 Annual Report).

The reasons behind the increase in the smuggling of cigarettes are obvious. The first is the large price difference between cigarettes on which the correct taxes and duties have been paid, and cigarettes on which no duty or tax has been paid. Cigarettes have a very high value to their end-user compared to their weight and are easy to transport and conceal. It should also be emphasised that the penalties for smuggling cigarettes also play a role in that they are considerably less severe than the penalties for smuggling certain other contraband (for example drugs). Statistics relating to volume are difficult to come by. What we have, however, are statistics for the seizures made in the EU over the last few years

1997 - 264,250 master cases

1998 - 471,935 master cases

1999 - 569,010 master cases

2000 - 623,250 master cases

A master case contains 10,000 cigarettes. Figures for 2001 are not yet complete but we do not anticipate any reduction in the volume.

The involvement of organised crime in this 'trade' is well documented. Criminal organisations with widespread networks deal with cigarette smuggling, as well as acting in other criminal areas such as drug smuggling. It seems that the same logistics and *modi operandi* were being used by criminal organisations that deal or have dealt with drugs. The smuggling of cigarettes is attractive for criminal gangs because it frequently involves the same channels as those employed for drugs, unlawful trafficking in arms and illegal immigration. Today cigarettes, arms, narcotics and illegal immigrants travel along the same routes and their journeys are organised by the same organisation or by interconnected criminal organisations.

Of course, routes vary, but the smugglers are intelligent, well organised, well-resourced, mobile and can find new routes as quickly as routes are closed to them. They will obviously take advantage of countries that are politically unstable or in which the rule of law is weak, and will attempt to subvert law enforcement and the administration of justice. One trend that has been noticed is a move away from illegal traffic in fast speedboats across, for example, the Adriatic Sea from the former Yugoslavia towards more smuggling inside 'legitimate' loads - hiding the cigarettes inside cargo.

Environmental Disasters

While maritime security is becoming a prominent issue, maritime safety must not be overshadowed; particularly when it results in either the loss of life or widespread marine pollution. On 12 December 1999 the *Erika* broke in two off the coast of Brittany, France, whilst carrying approximately 30,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. Some 19,800 tonnes were spilled. The sunken bow section contained 6,400 tonnes of cargo and the stern a further 4,700 tonnes. Operations to pump the remaining oil to the surface were carried out during the period June - September 2000. Clean-up operations took place along some 400 kilometres of polluted coastline and continue in certain areas. Over 200 000 tonnes of oily waste have been collected from the shoreline and temporarily stockpiled pending final disposal. (See Annex 2)

This was not an isolated incident. The *Baltic Carrier* collided with the bulk carrier *Tern* on 29 March 2001 off Rostock (Germany), spilling 2,500 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. The oil caused considerable pollution damage in Denmark and Sweden. In 1996, more than 72,000 tonnes of oil poured from the *Sea Empress* during the six days it was stranded on rocks, affecting 200 kilometres (120 miles) of the Pembrokeshire coastline. The total cost of the incident, including clean-up operations, the impact assessment and losses to fishing and tourism, has been estimated at up to UK£100m.

Air/Sea Rescue

The safety of EU waters has also been brought into sharp focus when human tragedy occurs as a consequence of accidents involving either commercial or private vessels. The need for a co-ordinated rescue service is evident. A combined rescue effort between Norway and England had to be organised in the North Sea for the *Scandinavia Princess* as the ferry from Newcastle to Norway ran into difficulty (May 2002). The Zeebrugge tragedy, in which the Herald of Free Enterprise overturned and 200 people died, and the sinking of the Estonia in 1994, in which more than 850 died, raised major concerns about the safety of cross-channel ferries.

Fisheries Protection

The EU is the world's third largest fishing power after China and Peru. The fleet of the European Union is made up of 99,170 vessels. Over the past decade, the number of vessels has decreased by 7% while the capacity of the fleet has been reduced by 5%. Greece has the largest fleet with more than 20% of EU vessels, closely followed by Italy (16.5%) and Spain (18.1%); Belgium ranks the lowest with just (0.1%) of the entire fleet.

The total number of people employed directly in the catching sector is 251,685. The fishing sector represents between 1 and 1.5% of all jobs in some 300 EU coastal zones. This percentage increased to 10% in 20 of the zones on the northeast of Spain and the east coasts of Italy and Scotland

Disappearing fish stocks, reduced catches, over-fishing, ineffective control and sanctions have all combined to send alarm bells ringing at EU level prompting plans to initiate a major reform of the Common Fisheries Policy.

On the basis of current scientific advice regarding EU fish stocks, and on the basis of the projected EU fleet activity, the policy approach of the Commission will be based upon a recommended cut in fishing effort (between up to 30% and 60% according to the state of stocks and the regions) under multi-annual plans. This would result in an estimated withdrawal of some 8,600 vessels which represents 8.5% of the number of EU fishing vessels and about 350,000 GT or 18% in tonnage.

Whatever figure is eventually agreed upon a huge policing effort will be required to ensure that policy is implemented successfully. This is recognised by the Commission in its policy paper in which it proposed the creation of a Joint Inspection Structure pooling EU and national means and resources for control purposes. This excellent and absolutely essential proposal could be developed even further.

I have given some indication of the major problems the EU is currently experiencing in a number of areas: human trafficking, organised crime, marine pollution disasters, air/sea rescue capability and fisheries protection. The one common thread linking all of these is that they occur in EU waters. They pose serious challenges to the safety and security of our citizens. The policy approach has to be co-ordinated and effective. Just as neither international criminals nor maritime disasters respect international boundaries, our response mechanism must be based on the same terms.

The EU should give consideration to the establishment of an EU Coastguard service and in this regard we can learn from the way in which the US coast guard service combats similar problems.

US Coastguard

Every day, the men and women of the 35,000 plus active duty Coastguard, 8,000 Reservists and 32,000 Auxiliarists provide services in over 3.4 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zones. Each day, the U.S. Coastguard conducts 109 Search and Rescue Cases, saves 10 lives, assists 192 people in distress, protects \$2,791,841 in property, has law enforcement teams board 144 vessels, seizes 169 pounds of marijuana and 306 pounds of cocaine worth \$9,589,000.00, seizes 1 drug smuggling vessel every five days, has cutter and small boat crews interdict and rescue 14 illegal migrants, has Marine Safety personnel open 8 new cases for marine violation of federal statutes. It also processes 238 Seaman licenses and documents, has Marine Inspectors board 100 large vessels for port safety checks, has Vessel examiners conduct 20 commercial fishing vessel safety exams and issue 11 fishing vessel compliance decals, has pollution investigators respond to 20 oil or hazardous chemical spills totalling 2,800 gallons, investigates 6 vessel casualties involving collisions, allisions or groundings, has Buoy tenders and Aids to Navigational Teams service 135 aids to navigation, has Vessel Traffic Service controllers assist 2,509 commercial ships entering & leaving U.S. ports, has Icebreakers and buoy tenders assist 196,938 tons of shipping daily during the Great Lakes ice season, has International Ice Patrol sorties provide ice safety information to facilitate the 163,238 tons of shipping during the North Atlantic ice season, and has Auxiliarists conduct 377 vessel safety checks and teach boating safety courses to 550 boaters.

The Service's aids to Navigation Program and Vessel Traffic Services help to ensure safe vessel movements. Today, more than 8,000 foreign-flag vessels call at U.S. ports annually, and 25 percent of U.S. domestic/intercity trade moves by water; more than 134 million passengers travel in U.S. waters in ferries, cruise ships, and gaming vessels; some 110,000 commercial fishing vessels harvest waters under U.S. jurisdiction; and millions of Americans and foreign tourists use 16 million recreational craft and frequent thousands of miles of U.S. beaches. Greater numbers of ultra-large, deep-draft ships will soon call at "mega-ports," cruise ships carrying 6,000 or more people will head for more remote areas, and maritime trade will likely double if not triple during the next quarter-century. These trends put a premium on the effective control of waterborne flow of ships, boats and people.

As the only federal law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in both U.S. waters and on the high seas, the Coastguard's enforcement of U.S. laws and treaties focuses on conducting counter-drug operations, intercepting illegal migrants and contraband, protecting living marine resources and helping to curtail the weapons trade, among other critical tasks.

Its counter-drug missions are critical to achieving the National Drug Control Strategy goals: to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs that kill 15,000 Americans and cost the public more than \$110 billion each year. In the fiscal year 1999 alone, the Coastguard interdicted more than 111,000 pounds of cocaine, with a street value of \$4 billion.

The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone holds some 20 percent of the world's fishery resources and supports a commercial industry valued at more than \$25 billion. The Coastguard's boarding and inspections of both foreign- and U.S.- flagged fishing vessels have increased significantly in recent years and are critically important factors in helping to rebuild and maintain fish stocks at risk from overfishing.

Between 1980 and 2000, the Coastguard intercepted more than 290,000 illegal migrants from 44 countries. This flood of people is expected to increase in the future, as economic, cultural, ethnic, and political strife remains endemic throughout much of the world. The Coastguard will be at the front lines ensuring the safety and protection of America's maritime frontiers.

Security, maritime sovereignty and global engagement have continued to shape the Coastguard's roles, missions, and tasks since the birth of the nation. Today, Coastguard units play critical roles in peacetime deployments, humanitarian support, peacekeeping and enforcement, crisis response, and combat operations, across the spectrum of U.S. national security and military strategies. Coastguard support to numerous bilateral and multilateral international initiatives – including search and rescue, law enforcement, and environmental exercises – helps to underscore America's commitments to regional stability and peace.

The Coastguard's prevention, enforcement, and response tasks in marine environmental protection help to reduce pollution. The Coastguard enforces marine environmental protection and shapes the safety and pollution control standards for international and domestic maritime transport and offshore industries that can endanger America's fragile marine ecosystems.

The US Coastguard's prevention of oil spills from all sources and activities saves nearly \$6 billion each year in oil losses, cleanup costs, and environmental damage. When prevention and enforcement fail, however, the Coastguard maintains a rapid response capability to contain and recover from pollution incidents such as the massive 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Three Coastguard National Strike Teams – located on the East, Gulf, and West coasts – are at the ready to respond to major oil or other hazardous material spills in the inland waterways and coastal regions.

Since 11 September 2001, terrorism has been a preoccupation of world leaders. Terrorists could now just as easily use the seas as they used the skies on that occasion. If this were to happen a European (or indeed a US one) could be the line of first response to a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in a crowded port or roadstead.

Conclusion

These facts point inescapably to the need for the immediate putting in place of a European Union Coastguard. I emphasise that it should be a European Union Coastguard for three reasons.

Firstly, an EU Coastguard, I am convinced, will be the most effective and efficient way of responding to the issues outlined above. Having regard to their gravity and importance, the EU owes it to its citizens to be in a position to respond quickly to their legitimate fears regarding illegal immigration, organised crime, potential pollution disasters and maritime safety.

Secondly, having regard to the present state of the political evolution of the EU, an EU Coastguard rather than co-ordinated national operations would be a significant "communautaire" step forward.

Thirdly, the Convention on the Future of Europe is focused on how to reconnect the EU to its citizens particularly by making it more relevant to them. I would argue that an EU Coastguard would be a tangible representation of the EU in the lives of citizens.

Number of Drug Seizures, 1990-1998

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Cannabis	120,538	136,618	139,211	149,120	173,928	198,718	208,801	250,287	287,857
Heroin	38,446	49,120	56,724	56,748	56,803	61,822	56,609	57,670	56,193
Cocaine	11,003	13,302	15,907	16,909	18,140	22,294	23,022	30,054	35,060
Amphetamines	12,268	14,218	19,200	21,566	23,930	29,779	32,966	35,636	35,446
Ecstasy	582	2,294	3,288	4,068	6,694	10,469	13,956	12,276	13,062
LSD	2,229	2,175	3,312	3,599	3,593	3,024	3,137	2,712	1,983

Drugs seizures in the EU Countries, 1999

	Amphetamines		Cocaine		Cannabis		Heroin		LSD		Ecstasy	
	Number	Quantity (kg)	Number	Quantity (kg)	Number	Quantity (kg)	Number	Quantity (kg)	Number	Quantity (doses)	Number	Quantity (Tablets)
Belgium	2,163(1)	326(2)	547	1,761	7,362	5,847	720	83	73	1,047	2,163	489,566(3)
Denmark	1,250	3	547	1,761	4,569	14,021	1,230	96	15	83	197	26,117
Germany	3,811	360	5 491	1,979	30,433	19,909	7,748	796	434	22,965	2 883	1,470,507
Greece	N/A.	1	N/A.	46	N/A.	14,223	N/A.	97	N/A.	212	N/A.	2,815
Spain	1,800	50	17 445	18,111	54,642	434,249	11,715	1,159	249	3,35	1 995	35, 649
France	141	233	1 865	3,698	44,921	67,481	2,684	203	143	9,991	649	1,860,402
Ireland	467	13	213	86	4,538	2,577	767	17	29	577	1064	223,032
Italy	N/A.	5	N/A.	2,917	N/A.	68,034	N/A.	1,306	N/A.	5,509	N/A.	288,403
Netherlands	N/A.	853	N/A.	10,361	N/A.	110,341	N/A.	770	N/A.	2,667	N/A.	3,849,645
Austria	N/A.	N/A.	519	63	5, 079	451	452	78	56	2,811	215	31,129
Portugal	2	0	1,691	823	2,681	10,702	4,058	76	11	1,845	73	31,319
Finland	1 943	71	49	2	2,259	492	342	3	15	50	159	17,665
Sweden	5,073	124	346	420	5 989	1,191	1,244	64	37	1,592	160	73,250
United	13,194	2,017	5,619	2,957	97,356	70,684	15,108	2,342	465	67,408	6,438	6,323,469
Luxembourg	5 0	.02	56	0.3	375	5	306	2	1	1	10	357
TOTAL	N/A.	4,084	N/A.	43,247	N/A.	820,208	N/A.	7,092	N/A.	120,111	N/A.	15,051,385

NB:

N/A. = data not available.

(1) Includes also number of ecstasy seizures.

(2) Includes also ecstasy powder seized.

(3) Includes also amphetamine tablets seized.

Source: [Reitox national focal points](#)

Maritime Disasters in EU Waters

Shipname	Year	Location	Oil lost (tonnes)
Amoco Cadiz	1978	off Brittany, France	223,000
Haven	1991	Genoa, Italy	144,000
Torrey Canyon	1967	Scilly Isles, UK	119,000
Urquiola	1976	La Coruna, Spain	100,000
Independenta	1979	Bosphorus, Turkey	95,000
Jakob Maersk	1975	Oporto, Portugal	88,000
Braer	1993	Shetland Islands, UK	85,000
Aegean Sea	1992	La Coruna, Spain	74,000
Sea Empress	1996	Milford Haven, UK	72,000
Baltic Carrier	2001	Rostock, Germany	2,500
