

NOTE

Subject : **Summary report on the plenary session**
 – Brussels, 3 and 4 April 2003

I. OPENING OF THE SESSION

Vice-Chairman Amato opened the session with the announcement that the mid-May plenary session to discuss the draft texts on "External action" and "Institutions" would require at least two full days (15 May starting at 10.00, and 16 May, all day) and could continue until Saturday morning (17 May), if need be.

1. Debate on the draft articles relating to the area of freedom, security and justice
 (CONV 614/03, CONV 644/03)

Vice-Chairman Amato introduced the debate by emphasising that in drafting these texts, the Praesidium had endeavoured to ensure that these articles of the Constitutional Treaty reflected as accurately as possible the conclusions of Working Group X, chaired by Mr Bruton. That Group had succeeded in achieving a delicate and balanced compromise which the Praesidium wished to maintain. Accordingly, while these articles ensure that the instruments and procedures of ordinary law are broadly applicable, they acknowledge some of the area's specific features, such as Member States' right of initiative or a particular role for national parliaments. The Vice-Chairman said it could be considered at a later stage whether certain provisions, such as those on the European Council or the subsidiarity test, should remain in this section or whether they could be moved to another section of the Constitution. Referring to certain amendments still calling for unanimity

throughout the area of the current third pillar, the Vice-Chairman criticised the inflexibility of this rule in an enlarged Union, and emphasised the link established by the Working Group between making a major effort to define and limit the Union's competences, particularly in criminal law matters, the current definition of which is vague, and introducing the qualified majority rule for those limited competences. Finally, the Vice-Chairman referred to the cautious approach advocated by the Praesidium on the prospect of a European Public Prosecutor's Office. The latter could be created, unanimously and without the Constitution creating any obligation in this respect, following a process of development starting from Eurojust.

A large majority of speakers generally welcomed the balance and drafting quality of the Praesidium's draft articles, and the significant progress for establishing the area of freedom, security and justice, notably with the merger of the pillars and the application of instruments and general procedures. Many emphasised that these articles should enable substantial progress to be made that would be considered crucial to the success of the Convention as a whole. These speakers urged, in particular, that the unanimity rule be dropped on the grounds that it would be virtually impossible in an enlarged Union of 25 members to act in this area, and even less possible to meet the high expectations of citizens. On the question of security and justice these Convention members therefore supported the Praesidium's proposals to make qualified majority voting applicable; some suggested that, if necessary, a strengthened majority or a transitional period be used in certain particularly sensitive areas. A very limited number of Convention members preferred, however, to retain the unanimity rule for the whole area covered by the current third pillar.

A large number of Convention members wanted Article 31 in Part One of the Constitution deleted, questioning certain features or noting that these features should in any event be contained in Part Two. The main criticism of these Convention members was that this provision could give the impression that the current third pillar would remain despite the announced merger. Some other Convention members, however, either wanted to keep the article or submitted proposals drafting amendments to it.

Only a few drafting suggestions were put forward for Article 1 of Part Two, defining the main objectives and aspects. The principle of respect for different legal systems and traditions enshrined in this Article was welcomed by several speakers. Some Convention members also stressed the particular importance of the principle of subsidiarity for the area of freedom, security and justice.

Article X of Part Two devoted to the role of the European Council was the subject of many observations by Convention members. Some challenged the fact that the European Council should play a particular role in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) and that it would not play in the same way for the other areas of European action. As a result, those Convention members wanted this Article deleted. Some were concerned that the European Council might use this provision to "issue instructions or injunctions" to the European legislator (Council and Parliament), at the risk of divesting them of their powers. They were informed that the text as proposed by the Praesidium could not be interpreted in this way.

Others, more numerous, did not question the reality of the particular function of the European Council, but wondered whether it would not be preferable to incorporate this provision in the article in Part One to be devoted to the European Council (Article 15 of the preliminary draft circulated last October) rather than in the chapter in Part Two of the Treaty devoted to the AFSJ. Others rejected this suggestion, stating their support for this provision be included in the chapter on the AFSJ. Some said that reference to the particular role of the European Council in this area – irrespective of where such a reference should be included – formed part of the overall compromise which had made it possible to do away with the pillar construction. They had no wish to go back over the issues that had led to that compromise.

Several Convention members wondered about the provision contained in Article 3 on the role of national parliaments. Some suggested that it should be deleted and that the threshold of one third should apply for triggering the early warning mechanism, instead of the lower threshold in paragraph 2. Others suggested that the right place for this provision was in the protocols on national parliaments or on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

However, many Convention members defended the provisions proposed by the Praesidium which they felt took proper account of the conclusions of Working Group X. Others felt that the proposals were not ambitious enough to protect the prerogatives of the national Parliaments. They submitted various proposals along these lines, in particular the setting up of joint control of Europol by the European Parliament and national parliaments, in the form of a joint Committee.

Article 4 on evaluation mechanisms was on the whole favourably received, although some Convention members suggested that it be deleted. However, several members made various drafting proposals to clarify its scope and effects. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the evaluation mechanism, in particular in the context of judicial cooperation.

Article 5 on operational cooperation was welcomed; very few Convention members wanted it deleted. Many members were satisfied with the distinction between the executive function (operational cooperation) and the legislative function. Several of these members wanted the committee referred to in this Article to be directly set up by the Constitution. The requirements regarding reinforced operational cooperation, which were felt to be important, were frequently emphasised. Finally, of the Convention members who spoke on this provision, a very large majority wanted the scope of Article 5 to explicitly embrace cooperation linked to border controls. These members felt that the Praesidium text should be clarified accordingly.

Regarding the right of initiative for a group of Member States (Article 8), while some speakers were opposed to this derogation from the Commission's monopoly of initiative, several other Convention members insisted that it be kept as a crucial element of the compromise reached by the Working Group. Several Convention members pointed out, however, that the question of how this right of initiative could be made compatible with the codecision procedure would have to be examined, given the Commission's particular role in that procedure. Some raised the idea that the Commission should be obliged to follow up, on its own behalf, an initiative called for by a group of Member States but this idea was rejected by certain other speakers. Lastly, some Convention members proposed either lowering the minimum threshold of States required for an initiative (e.g. 1/5 of Member States), or raising it (to 1/3).

Several speakers requested the deletion of Article 9 (judicial control), believing that, in the interests of compliance with the law in this delicate area, the general system of the Court's jurisdiction should apply without *a priori* exclusion of competence, and that in any case it was clear that the Court would not review the proportionality of action by the national police under their national law. A number of other Convention members, however, demanded that a clause on the limits of competences in this area be maintained in the text, in some cases stating that they wanted to return to the wording of the current Article 35(5) TEU.

The articles relating to the asylum and immigration policies (Articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Praesidium's draft) gave rise to a large number of comments. On the whole, these provisions were felt to be ambitious but to reflect satisfactorily the conclusions of the Working Group, in particular with regard to making qualified majority voting general. The remarks or proposals for amendments concerned the following points:

- A number of Convention members wanted it confirmed that the concept of "external borders" in Article 10 also covered sea borders and not only land borders. The Vice-Chairman of the Convention confirmed that this was indeed the Praesidium's interpretation.
- Some Convention members wanted better expression of the fact that the abolition of controls at internal borders did not exclude the possibility of the reintroduction of such controls in exceptional circumstances, in the event of a threat to public order. The inclusion in the text of draft Constitution text of the provision on this right (Article 2 of the Schengen Convention) was proposed by some members.

Concerning the draft wording providing for "the gradual establishment of a common integrated management system for external borders" in Article 10, several speakers wanted this provision to allow explicitly, or provide for, the setting up of a common frontier guard corps, which some wanted to have genuine executive powers. A small number of others rejected this prospect. Others stressed that the introduction of an integrated management system in no way implied – as the aforementioned speakers seemed to think – that the national officials in charge of such control

would change status and become European officials. That was not the aim of this provision. The responsibility for and management of controls at external borders would continue to be a matter for the Member States, even within the framework of a common integrated system. The administrative status of the staff would not be affected.

- Several Convention members approved the move to qualified majority in the area of asylum provided that European legislation would only concern minimum standards. Others gave their full support to the Praesidium's draft, but pointed out that such a suggestion was inadmissible as it would reduce the area already covered by European legislation. Furthermore, the suggestion by one member that the external dimension of asylum policy should be better expressed received the support of a number of others, without this altering the structure of the internal aspect of this policy.
- The question of immigration was also the subject of several comments. A number of Convention members expressed the opinion that a European policy was ambitious. However, the question of whether or not the legal basis for the immigration policy should also cover access to work was controversial. Several members wanted this question to come within the sphere of competence of each Member State or be governed by the unanimity rule. In addition, it was emphasised by many speakers that the aim of this policy could not be to set immigration quotas for each Member State.
- A number of Convention members questioned the introduction of the principle of solidarity in Article 13. They felt that this provision went beyond the context of asylum, immigration and borders. Others wondered what in practice fell within the scope of "solidarity" or asked that it be restricted to financial solidarity. Several other members stressed the importance of this Article and voiced their support for retaining it.

With regard to judicial cooperation in civil matters, the main issue raised during the debate was to what extent qualified majority voting could apply regarding aspects relating to family law. Many members supported the unanimity rule for all these aspects, while others called for a general move

towards a qualified majority. Some defended the Praesidium's compromise approach of making only parental responsibility subject to majority voting. Several also commented that it should in any case be made clear that paragraph 3 was applicable only within the limits of the Article as a whole, without creating any separate general competence for family law. In addition, some Convention members were in favour of harmonising substantive civil law in certain areas to be expressly listed.

With regard to Articles 15, 16 and 17, many members expressed their support for the balance achieved with these articles. One member, however, thought that the right balance between mutual recognition – the consecration of which in the Constitution he welcomed – and the approximation of legislation was not yet perfect. However, in addition to a small minority of members demanding unanimity for the whole of this sector (see above), there were also some who wanted it solely for Article 16 (criminal procedure) or only for "central areas" of criminal law. This position was criticised by several other speakers. A number of members also requested that the approximation of criminal procedural law (Article 16) should be linked to a cross-border dimension in order to exclude the purely internal aspects of criminal procedure. Some members argued for a provision to maintain the competences of the Member States to conclude international agreements on judicial and police matters.

Article 17 on the approximation of substantive criminal law was welcomed by many speakers. Some members wanted this Article to be more ambitious, in particular by proposing the creation of a "common core" and not merely minimum rules. Other Convention members expressed reservations regarding the scope of the second indent of Article 17 (which would allow approximation in all areas of crime affecting Union policies): for them this indent was too broad, and they suggested a second list of areas of crime to clarify the provision. In general, one member insisted on the need to define the Union's competences more precisely (she received the reply that the proposed Articles would achieve a definition of competences which was already much more precise and narrower than the present Articles).

The Articles on Europol and Eurojust were well received, subject to some drafting suggestions relating to the description of the potential tasks of the bodies in question (in paragraph 2 of each of the Articles). However, some members suggested reinforcing these Articles by stipulating that the tasks should be directly conferred by the Constitution, and not left to the discretion of the legislator as in the draft of these Articles put forward by the Praesidium. Other members wanted the extension of the tasks of Europol to be made subject to unanimity.

The proposal concerning the European Public Prosecutor's Office (Article 20) gave rise to a particularly animated discussion. A series of speakers expressed their opposition to this proposal and emphasised that they were not convinced of the practical necessity for the creation of a Public Prosecutor's Office or of its compatibility with the various national criminal systems. They considered a development of Eurojust to be sufficient. A large number of members did, however, express support for the idea of a European Public Prosecutor's Office, and in several cases requested that the creation of the Office should be entered as an obligation arising from the Constitution, or that its establishment should be enacted by a qualified majority (augmented, for some members). Some members proposed limiting this body to the prosecution of cases of fraud against the Union's financial interests. Others, however, voiced their satisfaction with the present wording, which leaves the legislator extensive freedom.

In his conclusions, Mr Bruton, the Chairman of Working Group X, first expressed his satisfaction with members' generally positive and constructive reception of the Praesidium's proposals. He then pointed out that although the right place for the provisions on the European Council and the national parliaments - including their roles in the evaluation mechanisms – could still be discussed, these provisions were in substance part of the compromise reached by the Working Group. While confirming the principle itself of a right to initiative for a group of Member States and of the threshold of one quarter, which he considered "reasonable", Mr Bruton acknowledged that there needed to be an examination of how the codecision procedure could operate in this context. He also stressed that the aim of Article 14(3) was not to contemplate an extensive harmonisation of substantive civil law, but rather what the Praesidium wanted in particular to propose was a compromise formula that would allow better progress to be made on the specific subject of parental responsibility. In answer to the criticisms levelled at the Article on criminal procedure, Mr Bruton

pointed out that in any case this Article was only aimed at minimum rules, and that the Group's hearing of experts had revealed a specific practical need for approximation of procedural rules in order to improve the fight against cross-border crime. He furthermore considered that a gradual formulation of minimum rules in this area might one day render the idea of a European Public Prosecutor less controversial than at present; he added that in the light of the debate, the middle course proposed by the Praesidium to create a simple, optional legal basis, exercised by unanimity seemed to him the right approach. Mr Bruton viewed with satisfaction the clear support for the Article on substantive criminal law, while noting with attention the concerns voiced by those who wanted better delimitation of the scope of the second indent; the Praesidium would have to examine possible solutions. In conclusion, Mr Bruton especially welcomed the fact that nearly all the Government representatives had made a particularly active and constructive contribution to the debate.

2. Presentation of draft Articles

The democratic life of the Union

Vice-Chairman Dehaene presented draft Articles 33 to 37 which were intended to be part of an effort to achieve greater transparency regarding the Union's activities and would be aimed at bringing citizens closer to the Union by establishing a dialogue between the institutions and civil society.

The Union and its immediate environment

Vice-Chairman Dehaene presented draft Article 42 on the Union and its immediate environment. He stressed the innovative nature of this Article aimed at establishing a framework for the Union's future relations with its neighbouring countries based on bilateral agreements.

Union membership and the general and final provisions

Vice-Chairman Dehaene presented the provisions relating to Title X of Part Two of the Constitution on Union membership and those of Part Three relating to the general and final provisions.

He drew attention to the importance of Title X as it covered all that concerned the status of membership of the Union, i.e. the conditions for eligibility and the procedure for becoming a member of the Union, the grounds for suspending the rights of a Member State deriving from the Constitution and the procedure for the voluntary withdrawal of a Member State from the Union. He added that this title included two major novelties in relation to the current Treaties: it expressly laid down the conditions for eligibility for membership of the Union and the possibility of voluntary withdrawal by a Member State.

The Vice-Chairman then referred to the provisions of Part Three, which in part incorporated the general and final provisions of the current Treaties, while making a number of amendments in a few of them, and which added new provisions on the repeal of the current Treaties and on the succession of the new entity "European Union" to the European Community and to the former European Union. The latter addition expressed the Convention's wish in the Treaty that the Constitution should not confine itself to amending the current Treaties, but that it should replace them.

The Vice-Chairman pointed out that the Articles presented that day would be examined by the Convention at its plenary session on 24 and 25 April and that the deadline for submitting amendments would be 11 April, so that account could be taken of them in the Secretariat's analytical role.

Finally, the Vice-Chairman informed the plenary session that, upon reflection, the Praesidium had decided not to submit a draft text on the open method of coordination. The Praesidium was convinced that there was already provision for the coordination of national policies, in particular in the areas for supporting action, as reflected in draft Article 15. The Praesidium feared that a new general article on that method might weaken rather than strengthen the possibility of having recourse to it and that such an article might introduce some confusion as regards the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States. The Vice-Chairman stated that the Praesidium was nevertheless amenable to any suggestions from Convention members.

3. Articles 38 to 40: Union finances

Introduction

Mr Dehaene opened the debate by giving a reminder that the Praesidium still had to adapt draft Articles 38 to 40 in the light of ongoing discussions and of the outcome of the discussion circle on the budgetary procedure chaired by Mr Christophersen, which would be completing its work that same afternoon. He announced the creation of a new discussion circle on own resources chaired by Mr Méndez de Vigo (the mandate for which, as approved by the Praesidium, was distributed during the meeting, see CONV 654/03).

Mr Dehaene then reviewed the 69 amendments submitted which expressed very divergent positions. He nevertheless drew a number of conclusions:

- the proposal to formalise in the Constitution the financial perspective, which would lay down compulsory ceilings per category of expenditure, as a binding framework for the annual budget seemed to meet with consensus.
- The budgetary principles proposed by the Praesidium in draft Article 39 were well received; some proposed the addition of the principle of necessary means currently contained in Article 6(4) of the Treaty on European Union.
- As regards own resources, many amendments proposed that the possibility of creating European taxes remain open.

However, the majority of amendments concerned the decision-making procedures, either as regards the system of own resources, the financial perspective or the annual budget. Most of them usually expressed contradictory views.

Progress report on the circle on the budgetary procedure

Before opening the debate, Mr Dehaene asked Mr Christophersen to take stock of the progress made in the discussion circle on the budgetary procedure.

Mr Christophersen pointed out that there appeared to be a consensus within the circle on the inclusion in the Constitution of the financial perspective, which would thus become legally binding. This would help to simplify the budgetary procedure, implying in particular the removal of procedural differences between compulsory expenditure (CE) and non-compulsory expenditure (NCE).

He then pointed out that the debate within the circle had shown that there were three levels to be taken into account when dealing with the concrete arrangements for the inclusion of the "financial framework" (the circle was also proposing that the name of the perspective be changed to "multiannual financial framework") in the Constitution. The question was which provisions relating to the "multiannual framework" should be included in Part One of the Constitution, and which in Part Two and, finally, what should be left to the area of secondary legislation in the form of legal acts to be adopted on the basis of the Constitution.

Most members considered that Part One of the Constitution should contain a specific article on the "financial framework" which should include the following elements:

- it should specify that the "financial framework" constitutes a binding framework for the annual budget;
- it should include the principle that the "financial framework" determines the binding amounts of the annual ceilings for commitment appropriations by heading within the limits of the Union's own resources;
- it should also contain the legal basis enabling the Institutions to adopt for a specific given period the legal act containing the "financial framework" itself and, consequently, the decision-making procedure. The circle seemed to favour a procedure whereby the initiative would be left to the Commission, but which would constitute an exception in relation to the consequences of the Commission's initiative as regards voting within the Council. The Council, meeting at the highest political level, would adopt by a superqualified majority, in the event that such a majority were defined in the Constitution in a broader context, or by a qualified majority, the law on the multiannual financial framework. It would act following the European Parliament's assent.

Part Two of the Constitution should include:

- the principle whereby the "financial framework" establishes not only the amount of the annual ceilings on commitment appropriations by heading, but also the amount of the annual ceiling on payment appropriations. The number of headings should be limited on pain of depriving the annual budget of its substance;
- the principle of a flexibility instrument, the arrangements for which would be laid down by the "framework" itself;
- the length of the period covered by the "financial framework" which should be at least five years;
- a mechanism to remedy the possible failure of the procedure for adopting the "framework" and which could consist of the extension of the final year of the previous "framework";
- the principle whereby the budgetary authority and the Commission ensure that the funds required to cover expenditure are available so that the Union can fulfil its legal obligations towards third parties.

This Group has not yet reached a conclusion regarding the annual procedure. However, certain features which could form the basis of a consensus seem to be emerging:

- the Commission would submit the draft budget; this implies in particular that it could amend its proposal up to the conciliation stage. This would not prejudice voting rules within the Council;
- the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure would be abolished, subject to the tightening up of disciplinary procedure by means of formal inclusion of the "financial framework" in the Constitution and particularly by inclusion of the principle whereby the budgetary authority and the Commission ensure that the necessary funds are available to ensure that the Union can fulfil its legal obligations towards third parties;
- the procedure should formalise the conciliation mechanisms developed in practice;
- the procedure could be shortened, starting on 1 September and finishing in mid-December. It would entail a single reading by each institution, Parliament and Council, and a conciliation stage.

The circle was still undecided as to the procedure to be adopted in a situation where there was no agreement between the two institutions.

The debate

Regarding the procedure for adopting the own resources system, the opinions voiced by the Convention members were divided between those wishing to change the procedure and those wishing to keep it as it stood. A good number of Convention members thought that retaining the current procedure which requires not only unanimity within the Council but also national ratification could endanger the Union's ability to finance its policies in the future. Other members, on the other hand were in favour of retaining the current procedure in order to safeguard in particular the competences of national parliaments in this respect.

Many members were in favour of strengthening the European Parliament's role in the procedure.

Those wishing to make the procedure for adopting the own resources system more flexible pointed out that the current procedure did not seem suited to the creation of new "genuinely" own resources over and above national contributions. In this context, a number of Convention members supported the idea of providing for the possibility of establishing European taxes. Some speakers proposed a dual procedure: the current procedure for determining the ceiling on resources and a more flexible procedure for the other elements of the resources system. Others were in favour of keeping the present procedure: this had made it possible to introduce new resources in the past.

There was broad consensus on the proposal by the Praesidium to formalise the financial perspective in the Constitution. This perspective would determine the ceilings on expenditure by heading, which would become a legally binding framework for the annual budget. Opinions were divided as to the procedure. A number of speakers considered that the Council should play a predominant role in the definition of the perspective. Some members suggested using the codecision procedure. Others took the view that the Council must decide unanimously at least on the ceilings on expenditure by heading.

As for the period of validity of the perspective, several Convention members would like it to coincide with the political mandate of the Parliament and the Commission.

Many members were in favour of doing away with the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. Some of them, however, made such a move subject to two conditions: firstly, the ceilings on expenditure by heading should be made legally binding through the formalisation of the financial perspective in the Constitution and, secondly, the principle whereby the budget should provide for the appropriations necessary to cover legal obligations towards third parties should be embodied in the Convention.

In the view of these speakers, these same conditions would enable the annual procedure to be simplified on the basis of codecision. Moreover, a broad consensus emerged in favour of the idea of restructuring the annual budgetary procedure on the basis of simplified codecision. Nevertheless, differences of opinion emerged regarding the mechanism for settling the matter if the Parliament and the Council failed to reach agreement. Some would like the Parliament to have the last word, as is the case under the current procedure regarding non-compulsory expenditure. Others proposed that the lowest amount of those proposed be entered in the budget.

Some speakers wanted specific procedural arrangements to be made concerning the common foreign and security policy.

Some members supported the idea of giving the Commission the initiative both as regards the perspective and the annual budget, but without prejudging the rules for taking decisions in the Council.

Quite a few members thought that there was some overall logic to the budgetary procedures, and that institutional balance should be taken into account within that logic. Some advocated an institutional approach whereby the Council should have the last word on revenue and the Parliament on expenditure.

The budgetary principles proposed by the Praesidium in Article 39 were apparently the subject of broad consensus. Nevertheless, some Convention members proposed adding to that article the principle of necessary means, currently covered by Article 6(5) TEU.

Some speakers emphasised the principle of budgetary unity and defended the inclusion of the European Development Fund in the budget.

Conclusions

Mr Dehaene pointed out that the Convention members had confirmed in their statements the same conclusions as could be drawn from the amendments submitted, i.e.:

- on the subject of the system of own resources, many members were concerned about the future of the Union's funding if unanimity within the Council and the requirement for national ratification were maintained. However, some speakers were resolutely in favour of maintaining the current procedure;
- there was consensus on the proposal to formalise the financial perspective in the Constitution. Many speakers wanted the period of validity of the financial framework to coincide with the mandate of the Institutions;
- the budgetary principles proposed appeared to be accepted;
- there was a request for the annual procedure to be simplified. It became apparent that the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure could be abandoned under certain conditions. Specific procedures could be introduced for the CFSP.

4. Question Time

In reply to questions from Mr Fayot and Mr Einem respectively, Vice-Chairman Dehaene said that:

- the meeting between the Chairman of the Convention and the European Council on 16 April was that which had previously been planned for 20 March and had had to be postponed owing to international events. These meetings are in accordance with the Laeken mandate. The Chairman submits an oral report to the European Council. The latter may, through its discussions, provide useful clarification without involving any "directives" to the Convention;
 - in the final phase of the Convention, when it will be necessary to forge a consensus on the text as a whole, a new working method will have to be determined.
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Plenary session, Thursday 3 and Friday 4 April 2003

LIST OF SPEAKERS

in order of speaking

Thursday 3 April

**1. Debate on the draft articles relating to the area of freedom, security and justice
(CONV 614/03, CONV 644/03)**

Ms Teija TIILIKAINEN - Finland (Government)
Mr Frans TIMMERMANS - Netherlands (Parliament)
Mr Jan KOHOUT - Czech Rep. (Government)
Mr Alberto COSTA - Portugal (Parliament)
Mr Dick ROCHE - Ireland (Government)
Mr António VITORINO - Commission
Mr Paraskevas AVGERINOS - Greece (Parliament)
Mr Peter HAIN - United Kingdom (Government)
Mr Andrew DUFF - European Parliament
Mr Alain LAMASSOURE - European Parliament
(Blue cards: Voggenhuber, Abitbol, Meyer)
Mr Rytis MARTIKONIS - Lithuania (Government)
Ms Marietta GIANNAKOU - Greece (Parliament)
Mr Timothy KIRKHOPE - European Parliament
Mr Oguz DEMIRALP - Turkey (Government)
Mr Erwin TEUFEL - Germany (Parliament)
Mr John CUSHNAHAN - European Parliament
Mr Göran LENNMARKER - Sweden (Parliament)
Ms Neli KUTSKOVA - Bulgaria (Government)
(Blue cards: Gerhards, Cushnahan)
Mr Esko HELLE - Finland (Parliament)
Mr George KATIFORIS - Greece (Government)
Mr Ben FAYOT - Luxembourg (Parliament)
Mr Manuel LOBO ANTUNES - Portugal (Government)
Mr Jürgen MEYER - Germany (Parliament)
Ms Danuta HÜBNER – Poland (Government)
Mr Gianfranco FINI - Italy (Government)
Mr Hannes FARNLEITNER - Austria (Government)
Mr Franc HORVAT - Slovenia (Parliament)
Mr René van der LINDEN - Netherlands (Parliament)
(Blue cards: Van Lancker, MacCormick, Mendez de Vigo, Badinter, Stuart)
Mr Elmar BROK - European Parliament
Mr Dominique de VILLEPIN - France (Government)
Mr Algirdas GRICIUS - Lithuania (Parliament)
Mr Henning CHRISTOPHERSEN - Denmark (Government)
M Jan FIGEL - Slovak Rep. (Parliament)
Mr Eugen BÖSCH - Austria (Parliament)

Mr Johannes VOGGENHUBER - European Parliament
(Blue cards : Maclellan of Rogart, Roche, Würmeling)
 Mr Peter SERRACINO-INGLOTT - Malta (Government)
 Ms Hanja MAIJ-WEGGEN - European Parliament
 Ms Eduarda AZEVEDO - Portugal (Parliament)
 Mr Dimitij RUPEL - Slovenia (Government)
 Ms Elena PACIOTTI - European Parliament
 Mr Vytenis ANDRIUKAITIS - Lithuania (Parliament)
 Mr Edmund WITTBRODT - Poland (Parliament)
 Mr Péter BALÁZS - Hungary (Government)
 Ms Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN - European Parliament
 Mr Pierre LEQUILLER - France (Parliament)
 Mr Puiu HASOTTI - Romania (Parliament)
(Blue cards: Maclellan of Rogart, Teufel, MacCormick)
 Mr Joschka FISCHER - Germany (Government)
 Ms Gisela STUART - United Kingdom (Parliament)
 Mr Diego LÓPEZ GARRIDO - Spain (Parliament)
 Mr Alfonso DASTIS - Spain (Government)
 Ms Cristiana MUSCARDINI - European Parliament
 Mr Rihards PIKS - Latvia (Parliament)
 Mr Jens-Peter BONDE - European Parliament
 Ms Hildegard PUWAK - Romania (Government)
(Blue cards: Roche, Lennmarker, van Eekelen, Duff, MacCormick)
 Ms Lena HJELM-WALLÉN - Sweden (Government)
 Mr Caspar EINEM - Austria (Parliament)
 Mr Gijs de VRIES - Netherlands (Government)
 Mr Antonio TAJANI - European Parliament
 Mr Hubert HAENEL - France (Parliament)
 Ms Anne VAN LANCKER - European Parliament
 Mr David HEATHCOAT-AMORY - United Kingdom (Parliament)
 Mr Henrik HOLOLEI - Estonia (Government)
 Mr Alexandru ATHANASIU - Romania (Parliament)
 Mr Sören LEKBERG - Sweden (Parliament)
(Blue cards: Vitorino, Christophersen, Würmeling, Peltomaki, Hain, MacCormick, Dybkjaer, Meyer, Einem, Bruton)

Friday 4 April

3. Debate on the draft articles relating to finances (CONV 602 /03, CONV 643/03)

Mr Henning CHRISTOPHERSEN - Denmark (Government)
 Mr Pierre LEQUILLER - France (Parliament)
 Mr Alfonso DASTIS - Spain (Government)
 Mr Andrew DUFF - European Parliament
 Mr Jürgen MEYER - Germany (Parliament)
 Ms Danuta HÜBNER - Poland (Government)
 Mr Michel BARNIER - Commission
 Mr Elmar BROK - European Parliament
 Mr Göran LENNMARKER - Sweden (Parliament)
 Mr Alain LAMASSOURE - European Parliament

Ms Hanja MAIJ-WEGGEN - European Parliament
Mr Hans Martin BURY - Germany (Government)
Mr Josep BORRELL - Spain (Parliament)
Mr Peter HAIN - United Kingdom (Government)
(Blue cards: Tomlinson, Lennmarker, Fayot)
Mr Valdo SPINI - Italy (Parliament)
Mr Guntars KRASTIS - Latvia (Parliament)
Mr Filadelfio BASILE - Italy (Parliament)
Mr Carlos CARNERO GONZÁLEZ - European Parliament
Mr Guilherme NAZARÉ PEREIRA - Portugal (Parliament)
Mr. Pierre CHEVALIER - Belgium (Government)
Ms Cristiana MUSCARDINI - European Parliament
Mr Vytenis ANDRIUKAITIS - Lithuania (Parliament)
Mr Roberts ZILE - Latvia (Government)
Mr Franc HORVAT - Slovenia (Parliament)
Mr Erwin TEUFEL - Germany (Parliament)
Ms Lena HJELM-WALLÉN - Sweden (Government)
Mr Gijs de VRIES - Netherlands (Government)
Ms Pascale ANDREANI - France (Government)
Mr Manuel LOBO ANTUNES - Portugal (Government)
Mr Sören LEKBERG - Sweden (Parliament)
Mr Esko SEPPÄNEN - European Parliament
Ms Marta FOGLER - Poland (Parliament)
Ms Teija TIILIKAINEN - Finland (Government)
Mr Hannes FARNLEITNER - Austria (Government)
(Blue cards: Demetriou, Barnier)
