

Working Group VIII

Working document 20

## **WORKING GROUP VIII « DEFENCE »**

**Subject :** Paper by Ms Danuta Hübner:

- "Crisis management"

Members of the Working Group will find attached a paper submitted by Ms Danuta Hübner, member of the Convention.

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## **Contribution of Minister Danuta Hübner, Representative of the Government of Poland to the Convention on crisis management**

### **Achieving coherent approach to crisis management (enhancing the role of different institutions and bodies)**

The ESDP Project seems to be well in truck to equip the EU with instruments that should enable it to engage effectively in crisis prevention and crisis management of „classical” Petersberg type. To make the mechanisms fully operational, without changing dramatically the existing set-up, some refinements seem necessary:

- Strengthening the co-ordination between the different units of the Secretariat and the Commission
- Ensuing a swift decision-making process
- Guaranteeing ready access to financing preliminary stages of operations.

#### ***SG/HR in double-hatted function***

A significant role in providing the link between the capabilities and assets of the Member States and those of the Commission should be ascribed to the Secretary General, who could be double-hatted in his functions as High Representative and member of the Commission responsible for external aspects of the EU policy. Thus, without merging the structures of the Secretariat and the Commission, the new double-hatted Representative of the EU for external policy, including security and defence policy would have under his purview all the instruments necessary to implement the most appropriate mix of measures in a swift and coherent manner.

A consideration could also be given to creating two positions of Deputy/Assistant High Representative responsible for development and co-ordination of the civilian and military crisis management instruments and or traditional first-pillar instruments respectively. This solution would allow High Representative to act as an ultimate link with regard to external policy in general while retaining also an operational control over its ESDP and economic/diplomatic aspects. Permanent participation of the Deputy/Assistant HRs, in an alternate manner according to the specific topic, in PSC meetings would also be useful in terms of guiding the discussion and providing the inter-pillar input.

#### ***PSC as focal point for crisis management***

The role of PSC as a focal point for crisis management is well entrenched in the Treaty and no significant formal change to its remit as described in the Nice treaty seem necessary. For the times of crises, when the reaction time becomes crucial, the Treaty foresees the possibility for the Council to delegate its authority with regard to political control and strategic direction to PSC. This prerogative, if effectively used by the Council, should guarantee a speedy and competent crisis management on apolitical level. The close co-operation with the High Representative and/or his Deputies should additionally consolidate the leading position of PSC with regard to crises.

Taking into account the growing number of its daily responsibilities and broadening functional scope of its competencies, for the future different functional formation of PSC (e.g. development of military capabilities, monitoring of external political relations etc.) could be considered.

### ***Co-ordination in the field***

Taking into account the operational requirements of timely reaction to the changing situation in the field the Operational Commander designated by the Council should be equipped with the authority to manage all the various ramifications of the operation on the spot. In case of deploying by the EU several missions at the same time (e.g. civilian and military components), for which the chain of command would not be unified (no single joint commander – this solution might not be acceptable for some member states due to internal legal arrangements) the role of co-ordinator in the field should be played by the Special Representative, who should also be the first contact point for the heads of missions.

As a rule micromanagement of EU field missions should be avoided. In order to keep the decision chain as short and efficient as possible.

### **Financing crisis management operations**

The issue of financing EU actions related to crisis management is crucial for their success. The current financial arrangements seem not to correspond to the needs of speedy and targeted actions. While the bulk of expenditure, especially in case of military operations will continue to be borne by the sending states, there is a compelling need to have resources ready for rapid deployment of fact-finding mission or initial planing and set-up teams. For this purpose a start-up fund, co-financed by the Member States for personnel costs and the Community budget for common operational costs should be created. Such a fund could additionally serve to finance the operational activities of Special Representatives.

### **Shared perceptions and standards**

Finally, the institutional and financial arrangements should be complemented by a better understanding of mechanisms and goals of the EU in crisis management on the working level. To achieve that, two projects could be developed:

- ***A comprehensive concept of civil-military co-operation in crisis management.*** This is the field where there is great need for conceptual and practical work. It is also where the EU, given its unique blend of available instruments, can and should pull its weight to bring the added value that could be shared with other organisations as its contribution.
- ***European Military and Police colleges*** that would provide education along the lines of common curriculum at staff level thus gradually introducing common understanding and universalised procedures for operations under the EU auspices. The EU staff colleges would be the first institutions to convey to staff officers from the Member States (and possibly from other partner countries, including non-EU European Allies) the genuinely European approach to tackling crises, basing on the EU concepts concerning crisis management and civil-military co-operation. Given the limited capacities of the EU bodies responsible in the first place for concept development, these institutions could also support the EU bodies (Police Unit and Military Staff) in preparing and refining basic conceptual documents.